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HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE COVERAGE OF
NEGLIGENT TRANSMISSION OF SEXUALLY
TRANSMITTED DISEASE
Every year, hundreds of thousands of Americans contract sex-
ually transmitted diseases ("STDs") such as herpes, syphilis, gon-
orrhea and AIDS.' The Health Insurance Association has estimated
that during the year 1987, large private health insurers paid $250
million in AIDS related claims alone. 2 Thus far, insurance company
exposure with regard to STD transmission has been limited to
health insurance. Two 1988 cases, however, threaten to increase
insurance company cost exposure to STD cases. The Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court in State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Irene S. (Anonymous), 3 and the Minnesota Court of
Appeals in North Star Mutual Insurance Co. v. R.W. 4 both held that
homeowner's liability insurance may cover an insured homeowner's
negligent transmission of an STD to' a third party. 5
In both the New York and Minnesota cases, plaintiffs alleged
that the insured defendant had negligently transmitted an STD to
them, and the plaintiffs sought damages for their injuries." Courts
have long allowed recovery in tort for negligent transmission of
STDs using general negligence standards:7 In recent years, courts
have consistently rejected arguments that STD transmission is in
some way different from other negligent acts. 8 The New York and
1 The Centers for Disease Control report approximately the following levels of new
STD cases for 1989: AIDS, 33,000; Gonorrhea, 689,000; Syphilis, 41,000. 38 CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 886 ( Jan. 5, 1990). Approx-
imately 300,000 or more new cases of genital herpes occur each year in the United States.
D. LLEWELLYN-JONES, HERPES, AIDS  AND OTHER SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 78 (1985).
2
 Freundich & Brandt, Now that AIDS is Treatable, Who'll Pay the Crushing Cost?, Bus,
WEEK, Sept. 11, 1989, at 115.
3
 138 A.D.2c1 589, 591, 526 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (1988).
4
 431 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
5 Irene S., 138 A.D,2d at 591, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 173; R.W., 431 N.W,2d at 141.
s R.W., 431 N.W.2d at 139, 141; Irene S., 138 A.D.2d at 589-90, 526 N.Y,S.2d at 172—
73.
See, e.g., Kathleen K. v, Robert B., 105 Cal. App. 3d 992, 997, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273,
276-77 (1984); Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 539, 333 S.E,2d 852, 854 (1985); B.N. v.
K.K., 312 Md. 135, 152-53, 538 A.2d 1175, 1184 (1988); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516,
518, 105 S.E. 206, 207 (1920).
s See, e.g., Kathleen K., 105 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 198 Cal, Rptr. at 276-77 (refusing to
find a right of privacy blocking such suits); Long, 175 Ga. App. at 539, 333 S.E.2d at 854
(refusing to find no cause of action when the act in which the STD was transmitted was
illegal).
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Minnesota cases, however, were different from typical negligent
transmission cases because the defendants carried homeowner's in-
surance policies."
Typically, such policies cover liability to third parties arising
out of the insured's negligent acts.'" These policies further require
the insurance company to defend, on the insured's behalf, against
suits that allege liability that would be covered under the policy."
In both of these cases, however, the defendant's insurance company
refused to defend against the suit under the defendant's home-
owner's policy. The companies reasoned that such policies do not
cover negligent STD transmission and thus, there is no duty to
defend against these claims.' 2 Both courts disagreed with the insur-
ance companies, citing well established principles of both negligence
and insurance law to hold that, because the pleadings in these cases
alleged negligence, homeowner's policies should cover the suits.' 3
The insurance companies, therefore, had an obligation to defend
against such suits because the courts reasoned that negligent trans-
mission of STDs is not fundamentally different from any other
action in negligence."
Once an insurance company is compelled to defend its insured,
it must consider the defenses available to the underlying tort ac-
tion.' 5
 The insurance company may attempt to show that, despite
the plaintiff's allegations, one of the essential elements of negligence
was actually missing from the insured defendant's actions. 16 Such
an element would be, for example, a lack of duty to inform plaintiffs
of the risk because the defendants were completely unaware that
they were capable of transmitting an STD.' 7 Alternatively, the de-
fendant might be able to show that the plaintiff had assumed the
risk or was contributarily negligent, or that the defendant was not,
in fact, the source of the plaintiff's injury.' 8 Defendants have also
See R.111,, 431 N.W.2d at 139, 140; Irene S., 138 A.D.2d at 590,526 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
IS See Couch ON INSURANCE 2d 44:287 (Rev. Ed. 1984) thereinafter Coucatl.
11 See R. KEETON & A. Wtonis, INSURANCE LAW 988 (1988).
R.W., 431 N.W.2d at 139,141; Irene S., 138 A.D.2i1 at 590,526 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
R.W., 431 N.W.2d at 141-43; Irene S., 138 A.D.2d at 591,526 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
14 R. W., 431 N.W.2d at 143; Irene S., 138 A.D.2d at 591,526 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
15 See infra notes 160-87 & 250-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
defenses available to an insurance company in these circumstances.
1 " See infra notes 227-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of this category of
defenses.
17 See, e.g., C.A.U. v. WI-, 438 N.W.2d 441,443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (lack of duty).
See infra notes 204
-
05 & 213- 19 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
defenses.
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asserted various affirmative defenses in negligent transmission of
STD cases including illegality, privacy and spousal immunity.'• In
recent cases, however, these defenses have met with little success.'"
Insurers, however, may be able to avoid involvement in cases
of negligent transmission of STDs.'' One approach would be to
exclude coverage for such suits from typical homeowner's policies
in the future." Alternatively, insurance companies might be able to
reduce the number of potential cases through educational efforts
aimed at promoting "safe sex.""
This note analyzes the validity of the New York and Minnesota
holdings and discusses the possible measures that insurance com-
panies may take to protect themselves if other jurisdictions accept
these holdings. Section I examines the requirements of the under-
lying tort action of negligent transmission of sexually transmitted
disease:2' 1 Section II discusses the liability coverage of typical home-
owner's insurance policies and the insurance company's duties un-
der that coverage." Section III discusses the holdings of the New
York and Minnesota courts in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Irene
S. (Anonymous) and North Star Mutual Insurance Co. v. R.W. that
homeowner's insurance may cover negligent transmission of sex-
ually transmitted diseases.'" Section IV discusses some of the de-
fense options available to an insurance company whose insured is
involved in a negligent transmission case. 27 Section V presents and
analyzes legal and policy arguments with regard to whether other
jurisdictions should follow the New York and Minnesota holdings
and concludes that they should." Section V goes on to analyze the
possible responses that insurance companies may take if these rul-
19 See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 105 Cal. App. 3d 992, 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273,
276 (1984) (privacy); Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 538, 333 S.E.2d 852, 853 (1985)
(illegality); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 70H S.W.2d 651, 652 (Mo. 1986) (interspousal immunity); Crow-
ell V. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 522-24, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920) (interspousal immunity).
29 See, e.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 105 Cal. App. 3d 992, 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273,
276 (1984) (privacy); Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 538, 333 S.E.2d 852, 853 (1985)
(illegality); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S,W,2d 651, 652 (Mo. 1986) (interspousal immunity).
21 See infra notes 263-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of various methods
of disengaging homeowner's insurance from this
22 Sec infra note 263 and accompanying text for a discussion of such exclusions.
2 ' Sec infra note 264 and accompanying text for a discussion of such educational efforts.
24 See infra notes 31-73 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 75-108 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 109-37 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 138-87 and accompanying text.
2' See infra notes 188-218 and accompanying text.
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ings are widely accepted, both in defending cases under current
policies and prospectively. 29
I. THE UNDERLYING TORT ACTION
During the past century, courts have gradually come to recog-
nize that they should apply ordinary principles of negligence to
cases of disease transmission and, specifically, to STDs." The re-
2" See infra notes 219-66 and accompanying text.
3" See Comment, You Wouldn't Give Me Anything Would You? 'fort Liability For Genital
Herpes, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 60, 64-69 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, You Wouldn't Give Me
Anything) (good summary of the development of this area of tort law); see also Spake, Ardor
in the Court, 14 STUDENT LAW. 14, 18-19 (Oct. 1985); Note, Liability in Tort for the Sexual
Transmission of Disease: Genital Herpes and the Law, 70 Courvell. L. REV. 101, 125-32 (1984)
[hereinafter Note, Genital Herpes and the Law].
Courts have not made legal distinctions between the various STDs on the basis of their
differing characteristics. These differences can be important from an evidentiary point of
view, however. This is especially true with regard to the immediacy of appearance of symp-
toms of the various diseases after exposure to them.
AIDS is a viral disease. J. LANGONE, AIDS: THE FACTS 44 (1988). As of 1988, AIDS is
spread primarily through the activities of sexually active homosexual men and users of
intravenous drugs. Id. at 10. Once infected, antibodies to the virus can usually be detected
in blood samples of the infected person within two to eight weeks. Id. at 11. For unknown
reasons antibodies may not develop in some infected persons for up to six months or even
longer. Id. Although antibodies are detectable, the infected person may have no other
symptoms of the disease for many years. Id. at 48. Despite the lack of symptoms these persons
can still transmit the virus to others. Id. at 10-11. When symptoms do eventually appear they
may include: swollen glands, loss of appetite, leg weakness, lever, diarrhea, dry coughing,
white sores in the mouth and cancer of the lymph system. Id. at 11-13. As the disease
progresses, the immune system becomes increasingly ineffective. Id. at 14. When this occurs
various opportunistic diseases take hold, including pneumonia, various infections and tuber-
culosis. Id. at 14-15. Eventually one of these opportunistic diseases results in the patient's
death. Id. at 14. There is currently no cure for AIDS, although AZT and other expensive
drugs may slow the onset of the disease. Now that AIDS is Treatable, supra note 2, at 115-16.
Like AIDS, genital herpes is an incurable viral disease. D. LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note
I, at 25. Herpes is not, however, fatal but rather manifests itself in a painful initial attack
and recurrent painful, but not particularly dangerous, attacks for the rest of the patient's
life. Corey & Spear, Infections with Herpes Simplex Viruses (pt. 2), 314 New ENG. J. MED. 749,
750 (1986). Five to ten days after the initial infection, the virus manifests itself as itching
burning blisters on the patient's genitals. D. LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note 1, at 23, Corey &
Spear (pt. 2), supra, at 750. Extreme discomfort is normal for seven to twelve days after
which the blisters gradually disappear and the pain subsides. I). LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note
1, at 23. Most patients suffer a second attack within a year. Corey & Spear (pt. 2), supra, at
750. A small percentage continue to suffer recurrent attacks after that. D. LLEWELLYN-JONES,
supra note 1, at 23. Attacks after the initial one, however, are shorter and less painful. Id.
Patients are definitely infectious during the attacks themselves. Id. In addition, patients may
be able to transmit the disease while suffering no noticeable symptoms. Corey & Spear,
Infections with Herpes Simplex Viruses (pt. 1), 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 668, 690 (1986). The only
long term health risks of herpes arc an apparent increase in the risk of cervical cancer among
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quirements of ordinary negligence may be summarized as duty,
breach of duty, causation of injury, and actual injury." The issues
of breach of duty, causation and injury are almost entirely eviden-
tiary in nature in the context of STD cases. 32 Thus, the legal debate
over the cause of action has been primarily confined to the question
of whether a duty exists that requires the defendant to warn of the
possibility of disease transmission.'"
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, numerous
state courts applied these elements of negligence to cases involving
the transmission of various diseases and held that tort recovery was
possible in such situations." By 1896, the Supreme Court of Wis-
women, D. LLEWELLYN1ONES, supra note 1, at 24, and increased danger of death of either
mother or fetus in pregnancy. Corey & Spear (pt. 2), supra, at 752. Drugs are available that
reduce some patient's symptoms. Id. at 753.
Gonorrhea is a bacterial disease usually transmitted through sexual activity. Grossman
& Jawetz, Infectious Diseases: Bacterial, in CURRENT MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT 920 (S.
Schroder, M. Krupp, 1. Tierney, S. McPhee, eds. 1989). Symptoms usually appear three to
live days after infection. D. LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note 1, at 19. These symptoms usually
consist of a urethral discharge and a burning sensation when urinating. Id. In many women,
however, the infection is largely asymptomatic and can only be diagnosed through lab tests.
Grossman & Jawetz, supra, at 920. Gonorrhea can be effectively treated with penicillin. D.
LLEWF.I.LYN-JONES, ,supra note I, at 20. This should result in the patient being fully cured in
about a week in 95% of all cases. D. LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note 1, at 20; Corey & Spear
(pt. 2) supra, at 921. Untreated gonorrhea can lead to infections that result in permanent
sterility in both men and women. D. LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note 1, at 20.
Syphilis is usually transmitted through sexual activity. Grossman, Jawetz & Jacobs, Infec-
tious Diseases: Spirochetal, in CURRENT MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS & TREATMENT 926 (S. Schroder, M.
Krupp, L. Tierney, S. McPhee, eds. 1989). In an average of three to four weeks after infection
a painless lesion appears on the genitals of the infected person and lymph nudes in the area
may swell. Id. at 928. Unless the lesion becomes infected, it will not become painful. Id. If
treated immediately with penicillin syphilis is fully curable. Id. at 927.
31 RESTATEMEN'E (SECOND) of TORTS § 281 (1977); PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 164-65 (1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
52 See infra notes 227-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the evidentiary
issues involved in bringing such a
53 E.g., Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 539, 333 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1985); C.A.U. v.
R.L., 438 N.W.2c1 441, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
E,g., Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477, 487 (1873) (tenant contracted smallpox alter
landlord negligently rented infected apartment to him); Skilling v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323,
325-26, 173 N.W. 663, 663-64 (1919) (doctor negligently told mother that her daughter was
not contagious with scarlet fever; mother contracted disease); Hewett v. Woman's Hosp. Aid
Ass'n, 73 N.H. 556, 567-68, 64 A. 190, 194 (1906) (hospital negligently failed to warn nurse
that patient had diphtheria, which nurse contracted); Kliegel v. Aitken, 94 Wis. 432, 435, 69
N.W. 67, 68 (1896) (servant contracted typhoid fever after employer negligently failed to
warn that his daughter was contagious). See, e.g., Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709, 709-10
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884) (tenant negligently exposed his child, who had whooping cough, to
landlord's child, who contracted disease); Hass v. Tegmeier, 128 III. App. 280, 282-84 (1906)
(doctor negligently exposed patient to smallpox); Gilbert v. Hoffman, 66 Iowa 205, 209-10,
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consin in Kliegel v. Aitken was able to hold, as a well settled propo-
sition of law, that defendants are liable in tort if their negligent
actions cause another to contract a contagious disease. 35 In Kliegel,
the plaintiff was hired to work as a servant in the defendant's home.
One of the plaintiff's duties was to clean the defendant's child's
sickroom. The plaintiff claimed that she was not warned that the
child had contagious typhoid fever, which the plaintiff subsequently
contracted." The court reasoned that if the defendant knew, or
should have known, of the risk to the plaintiff, he was obliged to
inform her of that risk. 37 The court concluded that this case was no
different from any other case of negligence even though a danger-
ous disease was involved rather than, for example, a dangerous
piece of machinery."
In 1920, the North Carolina Supreme Court extended this
proposition to a case involving negligent transmission of a sexually
transmitted disease in Crowell v. Crowell." The Crowell court held
that a husband could be held liable for negligently transmitting an
STD to his wife." In Crowell, a wife brought an action for battery
against her husband for fraudulently concealing that he had a
sexually transmitted disease.'" The wife alleged that this conceal-
ment led her to contract the disease. 42 Despite the fact that the
complaint alleged an intentional tort, the court held that the plain-
tiff would be entitled to recovery on a theory of negligence, even
absent a consideration of fraud or concealment. 43 Courts subsequent
23 N.W. 632, 634 (1885) (guest contracted smallpox after innkeeper negligently reined
infected room to her); Edwards v. Lamb, 69 N.H. 599, 599, 45 A. 480, 480-81 (1899) (doctor
negligently told plaintiff that no danger of septic infection existed in assisting him; plaintiff
became infected).
Kliegel v. Aitken, 94 Wis. 432, 435, 69 N.W. 67, 68 (1896).
46 Id. at 433-34, 69 N.W. at 68.
Id. al 435, 69 N.W. at 68.
Id.
'9
 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920).
40 Id. at 519, 105 S.E. at 208.
41 Id. at 518, 105 S.E. at 207. Many early cases involving transmission of STUB were
brought as cases of criminal assault or rape with allegations that would also have qualified
as civil battery. See State v. Lankford, 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 594, 594-95, 102 A. 63, 64 (1917)
(wife alleged criminal assault when husband, who knew he had syphilis prior to marriage,
married and had sexual relations with wife anyway); State v. Marcks, 140 Mo. 656, 677-78,
43 S.W. 1005, 1097-98 (1897) (Sherwood, J., dissenting) (The dissent's view of the facts was
that plaintiff claimed rape only after contracting gonorrhea from defendant. That is, plaintiff
had actually consented to the sexual contact, but not the disease risk and thus, defendant
might be liable in assault, but not rape).
42 Crowell, 180 N.C. at 517, 105 S.E. at 207.
49
 Id. at 519, 105 S.E. at 208.
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to Crowell have consistently extended the negligence cause of action
to transmission of other forms of STDs including gonorrhea,"
herpes, 45 and AIDS.46
Some early cases involving negligent disease transmission relied
on the existence of a special duty 011 the part of the defendant to
warn the plaintiff of risk. 47 For instance, in Kliegel v. Aitken, the
court held that the defendant had a special duty toward the plaintiff
because he was the plaintiff's employer.48 Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Iowa held in the 1885 case of Gilbert v. Hoffman that the
defendants had acted negligently by allowing the plaintiff to become
a guest at their hotel when they knew that it was contaminated with
smallpox." The court stated that the defendants, by keeping their
hotel open for business, appeared to warrant the safety of their
lodgings and, thus, had an obligation to warn that the hotel was not
safe. 5"
Some courts, however, did not base holdings in such cases on
any duty beyond that imposed on any reasonable person who poses
a foreseeable risk to another. In the 1873 case of Minor v. Sharon,
for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that
the defendant had violated his "plain duty of humanity" toward the
plaintiffs in renting them an apartment contaminated with small-
pox. 5 ' Recent cases of STD transmission have taken a similarly
broad approach, holding that a duty to disclose exists in any sexually
intimate relationship where the defendant knows of danger. 52
" E.g., Duke v. /loosen, 589 P.2d 334, 339-40 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863 (1979).
45 E.g., B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 143, 538 A.2d 1175, 1179 (1988); see Spake, supra
note 30, at 18-19; Comment, You Wouldn't Give Me Anything, supra note 30, at 60-81; Note,
Tort Liability for Genital Herpes, 2 COOLEY L. REV. 379, 380-84 (1984); Note, Genital Herpes
and the Law, supra note 30, at 101-140.
4" E.g., C.A.U. v. RI., 438 N.W.2d 441, 442-43 (Minn. Ct.. App. 1989); see Baruch,
AIDS in the Courts: Tort Liability for the Sexual Transmission of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome,
22 'rota & INS. L.J. 165, 173-90 (1987); Comment, Viability of Negligence Actions for Sexual
Transmission of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Virus, 17 CAP. U.L. REV. 101, 105-15
(1987); Comment, AIDS—Liability for Negligent Sexual Transmission, 18 Urn. L. lbw. 601, 709-
2`2 (1988); Comment, You Never Told Me ... You Never Asked: Tort Liability for the Sexual
Transmission of AIDS, 91 DICK. 1, REV. 529, 534-52 (1986).
" See, e.g., Gilbert v. Hoffman, 66 Iowa 205, 210, 23 N.W, 632, 634 (1885), Kliegel v.
Aitken, 94 Wis. 432, 435, 69 N.W. 67, 68 (1896).
4" Kliegel, 94 Wis, at 435, 69 N.W. at 68.
4" Gilbert, 66 Iowa at 210, 23 N.W. at 634.
5" Id.
u E.g., Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477, 487 (1873).
52 E.g., Long v, Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 539, 333 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1985) (holding
duty to be a general one based on roreseeability); B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 152-53, 538
A.2d 1175, 1184 (1988) (refusing to find duty only in marital relationship); see, e.g., Kathleen
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Until 1988, all reported attempts to recover for negligent trans-
mission of STDs were based on the duty to disclose arising from
the fact that the defendants actually knew that they had the trans-
mittable disease." It is an accepted principle of negligence law,
however, that the court can impute knowledge of the risk to the
defendant if the defendant should have known of this risk, even if
the risk was actually unknown to the defendant. 54 In 1988, the Ohio
Court of Appeals, in Reinke v. Lenchitz, used the "should have
known" standard for the first time in a case of negligent transmis-
sion of an STD." In Reinke, the court held that the defendant was
not entitled to a summary judgment in his favor, in an action for
negligent transmission of herpes, simply because the plaintiff was
unable to present any evidence indicating that the defendant had
actual knowledge that he had herpes." The defendant argued that
in order to state a cause of action in negligence the plaintiff would
have to show that he had tested positively for herpes or at least had
symptoms of the disease prior to his sexual contact with the plaintiff.
The court reasoned that a defendant might be an asymptomatic
carrier yet still should have discovered that he carried the disease. 57
The court noted that this might especially be the case where, as in
this case, the defendant was a medical doctor. Therefore, the court
held that the plaintiff had the right to attempt to show at trial that
the defendant should have known that he had the disease." Upon
such a showing, the defendant could be held liable. Thus, the Reinke
court, in effect, established a duty of reasonable care." Not only
must the defendant warn of a known danger, but the defendant
must use reasonable care to discover the presence of an STD. 6°
The 1989 case of C.A.U. v. R.L. was the first published case
where a plaintiff attempted to impute knowledge of AIDS to a
carrier in a sexual transmission case. 61 In C.A.U., the Minnesota
Court of Appeals held that if the defendant should have realized
K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 997, 198 Cal. Rptr, 273, 276-77 (1984) (refusing to
find duty only in marital relationship).
" E.g., B.N., 312 Md. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1177; Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 518,
105 S.E. 206, 207 (1920).
5 '1 PROSSER & KEETON, Supra note 31, at 182.






C.A.U. v. R.1.,„ 438 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
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that he might have AIDS, he would have had a duty to disclose that
fact but that in this case the defendant had no actual or imputed
knowledge of the risk he posed to the plaintiff. 62 The defendant
allegedly had engaged in homosexual activities prior to his hetero-
sexual involvement with the plaintiff. He did not tell the plaintiff
that he might be an AIDS carrier. During the course of the sexual
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant
suffered from possible AIDS symptoms.° His doctor, however,
failed to diagnose the cause of these symptoms as AIDS until after
the sexual relationship between the parties had ended. The plaintiff
contracted AIDS from the defendant as a result of their sexual
relationship."
The C.A.U. court was persuaded by the plaintiff's argument
that a defendant could be held liable for the transmission despite a
lack of actual knowledge." In this case, however, the court held
that the defendant had no imputed knowledge of any potential risk
to the plaintiff." The court reasoned that because AIDS was not
widely publicized in Minnesota at the time of, or prior to, the sexual
relationship between the parties and because it was not widely
known in Minnesota, at that time, that AIDS could be transmitted
through heterosexual intercourse, the defendant could not be held
liable.° Moreover, AIDS tests were not available until after the
relationship had ended. The court concluded, therefore, that the
defendant could not have accurately determined whether he had
AIDS or not. Thus, the C.A.U. court required only reasonable ef-
forts by the defendant to determine the risk posed to the plaintiff.°
In sum, negligent transmission of STDs today requires plain-
tiffs to prove the same elements as any other action in negligence.°
A duty to warn of risk exists whenever the defendant reasonably
foresees injury to the plaintiff:70 This duty exists even if the defen-
"2 Id. at 442, 444.
63 Sec supra note 30 For a discussion of AIDS symptoms.
IH hi




±'" See, e.g., North Star Mum. Ins. Co. v. R.W., 431 N.W.2d 138, 143 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Irene S. (Anonymous), 138 A.D.2d 589, 591, 526
N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (1988). Sec .supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of
ordinary negligence standards.
7" B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 138, 538 A.2d 1175, 1177 (1988), Crowell v. Crowell,
180 N.C. 516, 518, 105 S.E. 206, 207 (1920).
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dant was not actually aware of the risk, but should have been aware
of it. 71 The defendant is only required to be aware of the risk of
disease transmission if' the risk could have been reasonably discov-
ered:72 Today, defendants may not be held strictly liable for negli-
gent transmission of an STD. 73
 Winning a judgment for negligent
transmission of an STD is clearly a real possibility. Collecting such
a judgment, however, is a different matter. As with other types of
tort actions the obvious course for a plaintiff's lawyer is to find a
way to reach the defendants' insurer to cover judgments beyond
the personal means of the defendant. One avenue that has met with
success thus far is homeowner's insurance coverage for negligent
transmission that occurs within the defendant's home.
II. RECOVERY FOR BODILY INJURY UNDER HOMEOWNER'S
INSURANCE
Homeowner's insurance covers, among other things, injuries
caused by the insured to third parties. 74 This coverage is typically
limited by explicit exclusion of injuries that were "expected or in-
tended" by the insured. 75 Such exclusion does not, however, exclude
injuries caused by the negligence of the insured. 7" The overall in-
surance coverage includes more than just the duty of the insurance
company to pay for judgments or settlements arising out of covered
injuries. Typical coverage also requires the insurance company to
take over the defense of the insured in any suit against the insured
that alleges acts by the insured that, if proven, would be covered
by the insurance policy."
71 See, e.g.. C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Reinke v.
Lenchim 42 Ohio App. 3d 163, 164, 537 N.E.2d 709, 710 (1988).
72 See, e.g., C.A.U., 438 N.W.2d at 444; Reinke, 42 Ohio App. 3d at 164, 537 N.E.2d at
710.
73 See C.A.U., 438 N.W.2d at 444. As only duty was in dispute, plaintiff in C.A.U. would
have prevailed under strict liability.
71 See Coucti, supra note 10, § 1:61 and; R. KEETON & A. WIDDIS, supra note 1 1, at 1 142
for sample homeowner's policies.
75 R. KEE:EON & A. Wmins, supra note II, at 518-19.
7" E.g., Moore v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 967, 971-72, 295 P.2d 154,
.157-58 (1956); Vappi & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 348 Mass. 427, 430-33, 204
N.E.2d 273, 276-77 (1965); Casperson v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 98-99, 213 N.W.2d 327,
330 (1973); Barry v. Romanosky, 147 A.D.2d 605, 606, 538 N.Y.S.2d 14, 16 (1989); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 488-89, 426 N.Y.S.2d 273, 275 (1980); Lancaster
Area Refuse Auth. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 437 I'a. 493, 496, 263 A.2d 368, 369 (1970)
(per c;uriam).
77 R. KEETON & A. Winnts, supra note 11, at 988-89.
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Homeowner's insurance, like other types of insurance, is a
contract between the insurance company and the insured. 78 Despite
any legal requirement of uniformity in such contracts, market forces
have led to a "typical" form policy used with minor variation by
most insurance companies.'" Insurance companies present these
policies on a take it or leave it basis to the consumer. 8" This typical
policy is actually a combination of two different types of insurance:
true property insurance covering damage or destruction of the
insured's real and personal property, and personal liability insur-
ance covering the insured's liability for negligent or accidental acts
that occur on the insured's property." This note focuses only on
the latter element of coverage.
Liability coverage under typical homeowner's policies includes
coverage for (1) bodily injury; (2) to a person other than the in-
sured; (3) on the insured premises; (4) caused by the activities of
the insured. 82 Bodily injury is usually defined by the policy as "bodily
injury, sickness or disease . . . including death at any time resulting
therefrom."83 Mental distress has been held to be a bodily injury
when accompanied by physical injury." Significantly, For claims be-
tween husband and wife, the term "persons other than the insured"
does not include the spouse of the insured because the insured
party is usually defined by the policy to include the actual signatory
and the signatory's relatives resident on the insured premises." The
"insured premises" is usually defined as the insured's residence and
its surrounding lot, as well as any structures attached to it. 8"
Typically, policies significantly limit this rather broad coverage.
This limitation generally takes the form of an exclusion preventing
recovery in the event that the insured "intended or expected" the
79 COUCH, supra note 10, § 1:4.
79 R. KEE'ros; & A. Moms, supra note 11, at 118-21, 128; see, Couch, .supra note 10,
§ 1:61 and R. KEEToN & A. Winn's, .supra note 11, at 1133-47 for sample homeowner's
policies.
" Couch, supra note I 0, § 15:78.
" Id. § 1:01; e.g., Coucti, supra note 10, § 1:01 (sample homeowner's policy); R. KEETON
& A. Wtoms, supra note II, at 1133-47 (sample homeowner's policy).
92 E.g., Couch, supra note 10, § 1:61; R. Kr•roN & A. Wtoms, .supra note II, at 1142.
" E.g., Couc.tt, supra note 10, § 44:287; It. KEETON & A. Whnus, Supra note II, at 1133.
" See Levy v. Duclaux, 324 So. 2d 1, 10 (La. 1975), cert. denied, 328 So. 2d 887, 888 (La.
1976). But see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Diamant, 401 Mass. 654, 657-60, 518 N.E.2d 1154, 1 150—
57 (1988) (holding that while "personal injury" includes emotional distress, "bodily injury"
does not).
99 E.g., Coucn, supra. note 10, § 1:61; R. KErrox & A. Wino's, supra note 11, at 1133.
a E.g., Cowl, supra note 10, § 1:61.
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bodily injury. 87 Even if the policy does not contain such an exclusion,
courts may imply it on the theory that the insured should not profit
by his own wrong."
The "expected" injury exclusion could he read to exclude in-
surance coverage for negligent acts on the grounds that the negli-
gent tortfeasor's liability rests on the defendant's real or imputed
ability to reasonably foresee the risks of the negligent action. Thus,
in a sense, liability would rest on the fact that the defendant "ex-
pected" the injurious result. 8" Courts have generally refused to
adopt this interpretation, however, holding that "foreseeability"
does not negate the possibility that the injury was accidental and
thus, "unexpected." 90 Even the reasonably foreseeable, but uninten-
tional consequences of intentionally tortious acts are not held to be
excluded as "intended or expected" for purposes of insurance cov-
erage."'
An example of the distinction made by courts between foresee-
ability and policy exclusions for "intent" is the holding of the 1973
Supreme Court of Minnesota case of Caspersen u. Webber. 92 The
Caspersen court held that even an assault and battery could be cov-
ered by an insurance policy that excluded intentional injury if the
defendant's intent was not to cause injury.° In Caspersen the trial
court found that the defendant committed an assault and battery
against a hatcheck girl in a restaurant when he intentionally pushed
her out of his way in order to look for his coat. The trial court
found that as a result of the defendant's intentional actions, the
plaintiff had suffered more than $29,000 in injuries. The defen-
dant's general liability policy contained the same exclusion of cov-
erage for injury intended by the insured that appears in the typical
homeowner's policy.`14 Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court
" E.g., Id.; R. KEETON & A. Wino's, supra note 11, at 1143.
88 R. KEETON & A. Witmis, supra note 11, at 493-94.
89 E.g., White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497, 508 (Mu. Ct. App. 1969).
9° E.g., Moore v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 967, 971-72, 295 P.2d 154,
157-58 (1956); Vappi & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 348 Mass. 427, 430-31, 204
N,E.2d 273, 276-77 (1965); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486, 488-89, 426
N.Y.S.2d 273, 275 (1980); Lancaster Area Refuse Auth. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 437 Pa.
493, 496, 263 A.2d 368, 369 (1970) (per curiam).
9 ' E.g., Casperson v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 98-99, 213 N.W.2d 327, 330 (1973); Barry
v. Romanosky, 147 A.D.2d 605, 606, 538 N.Y.S.2d 14, 16 (1989).
92 298 Minn. at 93, 213 N.W.2d at 327.
93 Id. at 98-99, 213 N.W.2d at 330.
9° Id. at 96, 213 N.W.2d at 329; see supra note 87 and accompanying text for typical
policy exclusions.
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held that because the defendant did not act with intent to injure,
only intent to push, the injury itself was unintended and thus,
covered by the insurance policy.`''' Ordinary negligence, therefore,
does not generally fall within the "intended or expected" exclusion
to liability coverage."
The insurance company's obligations toward its insured begins
as soon as a third party brings suit against the insured alleging
injury of a type and under circumstances that would bring that
injury, if proven, under the terms of the insured's policy. 97 Insur-
ance companies could sell policies that only require them to reim-
burse their insureds for the costs of any judgment actually paid."
Out of fear, however, that insureds may bungle their own defenses
or settle too readily, knowing that the insurance company will have
to pay, insurance companies have sought to take full control of the
defense and settlement of suits against the insured." By taking
exclusive control of the litigation, insurance companies have given
insureds a related benefit; the insurance company takes responsi-
bility for the cost of the litigation as well as the ultimate settlement
or judgment.'°" This benefit is known as the insurance company's
"duty to defend."'"'
Based on the duty to defend, the insurance company must
defend the action and pay for the defense, even if the suit against
the insured is ultimately unsuccessful, groundless or even fraudu-
lent.'"2 In the event that the suit is unsuccessful the insured has no
duty to reimburse the insurance company for the costs of the in-
sured's defense.'" The duty to defend is triggered whenever a
11' Caspersen, 298 Minn. at 98-99, 213 N.W.2d at 330.
96
 See, e.g., id.; Moore v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 967, 971-72, 295
P.2d 154, 157-58 (1956); Vappi & Co, v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 348 Mass. 427, 430-31,
204 N.E.2d 273, 276-77 (1965); Allstate Ins. Co, v. Klock Oil Co,, 73 A.D.2d 486, 488-89,
426 N.Y.S.2d 273, '275 (1980).
"7 R. K EETON & A. Worms, supra note 11, at 988-89.
" See id. at 376.
"9 Id. at 988.
I'm Coven, supra note 10, § 51:35.
nn
102 Id.; see, e.g., Dillon v. Hartford Accident & Indeni. Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d 335, 340,
113 Cal. Rptr. 396, 398-99 (1974); Greer-Robbins Co. v. Pacific Sur. Cu., 37 Cal. App. 540,
543-44, 174 P. 110, 111 (1918); Colon v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 66 N.Y.2d 6, 9-
I 0, 484 N.E.2d 1040, 1041, 494 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (1983); Cordial Greens Country Club v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 996, 997, 363 N,E.2d 1178, •1179, 395 N.Y.S.2d 443,
444 (1977).
1 "9 See, e.g., Hogan v. Midland Nat. Ins, Co., 3 Cal. 3d 553, 563-64, 476 P.2d 825, 831,
91 Cal. Rptr. 153, 159 (1970); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 123 Misc. 2d
932, 933-34, 475 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
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plaintiff's complaint alleges liability against an insured defendant
and is based on alleged facts and circumstances, some of which, if
proven, would fall within the policy coverage.'" For example, a
complaint alleging intentional tort must be defended if the facts
could support a judgment based on negligence, even if plaintiff's
pleadings do not include a negligence count.'° 5
In sum, typical homeowner's insurance will cover most suits
arising out of injury that could potentially he the result of the
insured defendant's ordinarily negligent actions. 106 Even the unin-
tended results of intentionally tortious conduct will fall within lia-
bility coverage.'" 7 In any suit that alleges potentially covered actions
by the insured, the insurance company will have an obligation to
defend against the underlying tort action.'" Knowing that ordinary
negligence actions are usually covered by homeowner's insurance
and that cases involving transmission of STDs can usually be char-
acterized as ordinary negligence, plaintiffs and defendants have
now successfully brought these legal doctrines together. Insurance
companies may now be liable for the negligent transmission of STDs
by their insured homeowners.
III. RECOVERY UNDER HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE FOR NEGLIGENT
TRANSMISSION OF STDs
In 1988, two cases reached state appellate courts that involved
defendants who carried homeowner's liability coverage and who
were sued for negligent transmission of STlls. In both State Farm
E.g., American Home Assurance Co. v. Port Auth., 66 A.D.2d 269, 277-78, 412
N.Y.S.2d 605, 609-10 (1979); me, e.g., Hogan, 3 Cal. 3d at 563-64, 476 P.2d at 83, 191 Cal.
Rptr. at 159; Barnstable County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lally, 374 Mass. 602, 604, 373 N.E.2d
966, 968 (1978); Jostens, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Minn. 1986); Colon
v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 66 N.Y.2d 6, 9-10. 484 N.E.2d 1040, 1041, 494 N.Y.S.2c1
688. 689 (1983).
105 E,g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 275-78, 419 P.2d 168, 176-77, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 104, 112-13 (1966); Huntington v. Hartford Ins. Group, 69 A.D.2d 906, 906-07, 415
N.Y.S.2d 904, 905 (1979). Cf. Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. 163, 167-69, 450 N.E.2d
190, 193-94 (1983) (holding that if only intentional tort is alleged, then insurance company
is not obligated to defend when plaintiff has waived right to amend complaint even if facts
could support negligence).
1 "" Sec supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of ordinary negligence
vis-a-vis homeowner's insurance coverage.
' 07 E.g., Casperson v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 98-99, 213 N.W.2d 327, 330 (1973). See
supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
10" E.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 275-78, 419 P.2d 168, 176-77, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 104, 112-13 (1966); Huntington v. Hartford Ins. Group, 69 A.D.2d 906, 906-07, 415
NA'S.2d 904, 905 (1979).
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Fire & Casualty Co. v. Irene S. (Anonymous), decided by the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court, and North Star Mutual
Insurance Co. v. R.W., decided by the Minnesota Court of Appeals,
insured defendants had typical homeowner's policies.'" In each
case the defendant asked his insurance company to defend the suits
based on its duty to defend. The insurance company, in each case,
refused to defend and sought a declaratory judgment affirming
that refusal. The insurance companies succeeded at trial, but the
declaratory judgments were overturned on appeal in both states."°
Both courts held that insurance companies that issue typical home-
owner's policies have a duty to defend their insureds against suits
alleging negligent transmission of STDs because such complaints,
if proved, would be covered under the terms of such policies."'
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Irene S. (Anonymous) arose out
of a tort action brought by Irene Shapiro against Kenneth Polo-
kolf. 112 Shapiro alleged that Polokoff had assaulted and raped her
with the intent to transmit herpes. Alternatively, she alleged that he
had intentionally assaulted her and that this assault resulted in
serious injury to her.
Alter Shapiro filed her complaint, Polokoff gave notice to State
Farm, his insurance company, of its duty to defend the suit under
his homeowner's policy. Polokoff's policy with State Farm was a
typical homeowner's liability policy that provided personal liability
coverage for "damages because of bodily injury.""' As in most
typical policies, the policy specifically excluded coverage for "bodily
injury . . . which is expected or intended by the insured."" 4 State
Farm refused to acknowledge any duty to defend on the grounds
that the plaintiff's injuries were the result of the insured's inten-
tional acts and, therefore, were excluded from coverage. 115
To establish the validity of this position, State Farm filed an
action for a declaratory judgment regarding its responsibility to-
m" State Farm Fire & Casually Co. v. Irene S. (Anonymous), 138 A.D.2d 589, 591, 526
N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (1988); North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. R.W., 431 N.W.2d 138, 140 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1988),
431 NAV.2(1 at 141); /rime S., 138 A.D.2d at 591, 526 N.Y.S,2d at 173.
In I?, W, 431 N.W.2d at 140; Irene S., 138 A.1).2d at 590, 591, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
''' Irene. S., 138 A.1).2d at 589, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 172, The suit was initially brought as
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Shapiro, 118 A.D. 556, 557, 499 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (1986).
HI Id. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text for parallel language in typical
policy.
'' Irene S., 138 A.1).2(1 at 590, 526 N.Y.S.2clat-173. See supra note 87 and accompanying
text for parallel exclusionary language in a typical policy.
I u' Irene S., 138 A.0.2d at 590, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 173,
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ward the insured in this case. The lower court entered a summary
judgment affirming State Farm's decision not to defend the under-
lying action. The lower court held that none of the acts alleged in
the complaint could possibly be described as unintended or unex-
pected and, therefore, they could not be covered under the policy." 6
On appeal, Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
reversed the lower court judgment and held that State Farm did
have a duty to defend based on the actions and injuries alleged."'
The Appellate Court reasoned that although none of the acts alleged
in the complaint could be considered unintended or unexpected,
some of the injuries could be considered such."' For instance, with
regard to general injuries, the plaintiff alleged only that the assault
was intentional, not that the injuries were the intended result. " 9
On the theory that unintended results may legally flow from inten-
tional actions, the court denied State Farm its motion for declaratory
judgment by strictly construing the intended or expected bodily
injury exclusion against the insurance company. 12° Because the com-
plaint alleged injuries that, if proved to be unintentional, as asserted
by the defendant, would be covered by the policy, State Farm was
obligated to defend him. 12 ' The court acknowledged, however, that
the issue of the insurance company's ultimate duty to indemnify
the insured would have to await a factual determination at the
22
Eight months later, in North Star Mutual Insurance Co. v. R.W.,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals followed New York's Irene S. de-
cision and established that in Minnesota, insurance companies have
a duty to defend in suits alleging negligent transmission of STDs.' 23
R.W., the plaintiff in the underlying tort action, alleged that she
and the defendant, T.F., had voluntarily engaged in sexual inter-
course in T.F.'s home during May of 1984, that T.F. knew at the
" 6 Id.
117 Id. at 591, 526 N.Y,S.2d at 173.
Hm Id. (citing McGroarty v. Great American Ins. Cu.. 36 N.Y.2d 358, 364, 329 N.E.2d
172, 173, 368 N.Y.S.2d 485, 490 (1975)).
"" Id. at 589, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 172. The complaint alleged that: the defendant had
intentionally assaulted the plaintiff as a result of which she sustained serious injuries; the
defendant assaulted her with the intent to cause severe mental and emotional distress; or
the defendant assaulted and raped the plaintiff with the intent of transmitting genital herpes.
Id.
12" Id. at 590-91, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
12 ' Id. at 591, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
122 Id .
)" North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. R.W., 431 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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time that he had herpes, and that he failed to inform her of his
condition. 124 R.W. alleged that as a result of T.F.'s negligence, she
contracted herpes. She specified that T.F.'s acts were negligent and
not intentional.
During May of 1984, T.F. was covered by a typical homeowner's
policy issued by North Star Insurance.' 25 Upon receipt of R.W.'s
complaint, T.F. called upon North Star to undertake his defense
under its duty to defend suits for damages resulting from bodily
injury. North Star declined to defend T.F. on the grounds that
coverage for such incidents, according to the definitions in the
policy, was limited to "accidents" and that the policy excluded lia-
bility "caused intentionally ... by any insured." 12"
North Star sought and received summary declaratory judgment
stating that it had no obligation to defend or indemnify T.F. in this
action. North Star argued that Minnesota precedent established that
an action brought in negligence is considered an action in inten-
tional tort for insurance purposes, as a matter of law, if the action
arises out of sexual misconduct. North Star contended that "the
transmission of a sexual disease is never an accident, and the disease
does not occur without wrongful sexual conduel." 27 North Star fur-
ther argued that public policy dictates against allowing insurance
coverage for sexual misconduct.I 2g T.F. contended that his affir-
mative assertion, that he did not know at the time of transmission
that he had herpes, arguably made the transmission accidental and
u nintentional. 129
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the declaratory judg-
ment and required the insurance company to defend the underlying
action. The appeals court held that as long as there was a question
with regard to whether T.F. could prove at trial that he did not, in
fact, have knowledge of his condition at the time of the transmission,
there remained the possibility that the act could be considered
accidental and, therefore, covered tinder the terms of the policy.
The court stated that the trial court must determine the defendant's
knowledge and that until it made such a determination, the insur-
121 Id. at 139, 142.
' 25 Id. at 139, 140. See supra notes 82-83 & 102 and accompanying text for description
of typical policy terms.
125 Id. at 139, 141.
127
 Id. at 141 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 143.
' 2" Id. at 139, 140-41.
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ante company had an obligation to defend if the claim was arguably
within the scope of the policy.'"
The appeals court conceded that the Minnesota case law cited
by the insurer established that non-consensual sexual contact cre-
ated an inference of intent to cause bodily injury as a matter of law.
Based on this inference, previous courts had disallowed insurance
coverage for injuries resulting from non-consensual sexual acts.' 3 '
In this case, however, the court observed that the action was based
on consensual sex rather than a non-consensual assault, and thus,
distinguished it from the precedents cited by North Star. In reach-
ing its holding, the court relied heavily on the explicit allegations
in the complaint. 132 The complaint described the action in terms of
negligence and not intentional tort, even though the facts of the
complaint certainly implied an alternative action on grounds of
intentional battery.'"
The court completely rejected the argument that public policy
considerations dictate against allowing insurance coverage for "sex-
ual misconduct." The court indicated that if the insurance company
was concerned about other insureds bearing the cost of one in-
sured's sexual misconduct, it would be free, in the future, to exclude
specifically such coverage.'"
The courts in Irene S. and R.W. have established, for the first
time at the state appellate court level, that insurance companies do
have an obligation to defend their insured homeowners against suits
alleging transmission of STDs.' 15 The Irene S. court outlined the
possible extent of such coverage by imposing potential insurance
liability even for the unintended results of intentionally tortious
behavior.'" Moreover, the R.W. court rejected the view that actions
for negligent transmission of STlls are somehow different from
other negligence actions because of their "wrongful" nature, and
are, therefore, unworthy of insurance protection.'” Given these
' 3" Id. at 141.
1 "' Id. at 141-43.
13' Id. at 143.
133 See id. at 142-43. Paragraph 5 of the complaint reads: -That Defendant failed to
inform Plaintiff of this condition, thereby rendering null and void any consent to the sexual
act on the pail of Plaintiff which may have been given." Id.
' 34
 Id. at 143.
l " North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. RM., 431 N.W.2d 138, 140 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Irene S. (Anonymous), 138 A.D.2c1 589, 590, 591, 526 N.Y.S.2d
171, 173 (1988).
"" Irene S.. 138 A.D.2c1 at 591, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
137
 R.W„ 431 N.W.2d at 138.
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holdings, insurance companies will inevitably find themselves in-
volved in an increasing number of STD cases. The insurance com-
panies must therefore consider the various defenses available to
them in either refusing to defend such suits ter in carrying through
a defense on behalf of their insureds.
IV. DV,FENSES AVAILABLE TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY INVOLVED
IN A NEGLIGENT TRANSMISSION CASE
When the insured is sued for negligent transmission of an STD,
the insurance company has two basic levels of defense to liability
for a judgment. against its insured. First, the insurance company
may argue that For some reason it is not, in fact, responsible to the
insured under the terms of its policy. The insurance companies
raised this defense in Irene S. and R.W."" Alternatively, or following
the failure of the first set of defenses, the insurance company may
simply defend the insured and attempt to defeat successfully the
underlying tort action)" These defenses would include showing
that one of the essential elements of the cause of action is missing
or alternatively raising one of three affirmative defenses: illegality,
privacy or interspousal immunity.
The insurance company may refuse to defend its insured
against the underlying tort action only if it can show that the insur-
ance policy would not cover the alleged tortious behavior, even if
such behavior was proved to be true at trial.m For instance, if the
complaint against the insured defendant alleges only intentional
injury to the plaintiff, the insurer will be under no obligation to
defend the suit if its policy excludes coverage for intentional in-
jury.'''' If, however, the plaintiff alleges any action by the insured
defendant that would be covered by the policy, the insurance cum-
13" RM., 431 N.W.2d at 139, H1; Irene 5., 138 A.D.2d at 590, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 173.
Keeton notes a constant (low of such disputes in regard to the duty to defend. R. KEFroN &
A. WEnots,.saaprca note 11, at 989.
"" See infra notes 160-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the defenses to
the underlying tort action.
145 Sabatinelli v. Travelers Ins. Co., 369 Mass. 674, 677, 341 N.E.2d 880, 882
(1976); Pawelek v. Security Mm. Ins, Co., 143 A.D.2d 514, 514, 533 N.Y.S.2d 161, 161
(1988).
"I Id. But see Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 276-77, 419 P.2d 168, 176-77,
54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 112-13 (1966). In Gray, the court held that because of liberal pleading
rules, the plaintiff could, under the facts alleged, amend the complaint at any time to add
negligence to the exclusively intentional tort allegations. The insurance company, therelOre,
must defend whenever a potential for liability exists. Id.
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pany must defend the action." 2 Failure to do so may lead to a
successful suit against the insurer to reimburse the insured for costs
of defense and settlement of the underlying suit. 143 The insurance
company's unjustified refusal to defend may even estop the com-
pany from later claiming lack of coverage for a judgment or a
settlement.'"
In the event that disputes arise between insured defendants
and their insurance companies concerning the scope of policy cov-
erage, courts will consider the superior bargaining power that the
insurance company has because of its role in formulating the actual
language of the policy. 145 Courts will interpret the language of the
policy so as to cover risks that a reasonable insured would anticipate
that such a policy would cover, even if the actual terms of the policy
are ambiguous 'concerning that risk. 146
Even if the meaning of policy terms, such as "injury intended
or expected," has been generally established, disputes may still arise
with regard to whether the particular facts alleged fall within the
policy coverage."' In a suit against the insurance company alleging
liability for failure to defend, the insured carries the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the liability al-
leged in the underlying suit falls within the affirmative terms and
conditions of the policy. 148 But, because the applicability of policy
exclusions is an affirmative defense on the part of the insurance
'" E.g., American Home Assurance Co. v. Port Auth., 66 A.1).2d 269, 277-78, 412
N.Y.S.2d 605, 609-10 (1979); see, e.g., Hogan v. Midland Nat. Ins. Co., 3 Cal. 3d 553, 563-
64, 476 P.2d 825, 831, 91 Cal. Rptr. 153, 159 (1970); Barnstable County Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Lally, 374 Mass. 602, 604, 373 N.E.2d 966, 968 (1978); Jostens, Inc. v. Mission Ins. Co.,
387 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Minn. 1986); Colon v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 66 N.Y.2d 6,
9-10, 484 N.E,2d 1040, 1041, 494 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (1985).
143 E.g., Berke Moore Co. v. Lumberman's Mui. Casualty Co., 345 Mass. 66, 70-71, 185
N.E.2d 637, 639 (1962); Brown v. State Auto. & Casualty Underwriters, 293 N.W.2d 822,
825 (Minn. 1980); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Copier, 48 N.Y.2d 871, 874, 400 N.E.2d 298,•
299, 424 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (1979).
' 44 Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., 273 F. Stipp. 486, 491 (1). Mass.
1967) (applying Massachusetts law); Gray v. Zurich Ins: Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 279-80, 419
P.2d 168, 178-79, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 114-15 (1966); Sims v. Illinois Nat. Casualty Co., 43
Ill. App. 2d 184, 195, 193 N.E.2d 123, 128 (1963) (citing Rom v. Gephart, 30 111. App. 2d
199, 207, 173 N.E.2d 828, 832 (1961)).
'" See, e.g., Royal Ins. Co. v. Martin, 192 U.S. 149, 162 (1904).
"5 See, e.g., Columbian Ins. Co. v. Catlett, 25 U.S. 383, 386 (1827).
141 E.g„ State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Irene S. (Anonymous), 138 A.D.2d 589, 591,
526 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (1988).
1" E.g., Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 181 Cal. App. 3d 532, 538, 226 Cal. Rptr.
435, 437 (1986); Markline Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 139, 140, 424 N.E.2d 464,
465 (1981); Lapierre, Litchfield & Partners v. Continental Casualty Co., 59 Misc. 2d 20, 23,
297 N.Y.S.2d 976, 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
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company, the company bears the burden of proving facts that show
that such exclusions apply to the liability in question.'''`-' In the
context of an STD suit where the insured has typical liability cov-
erage, therefore, the insured will carry the burden of proving that
the policy was in effect at the time of the alleged injury,''" and that
the alleged injury was a bodily injury caused by the insured. 151 If
the insurance company refuses to defend the suit, however, it bears
the burden of showing that the injury was "intended or expected"
by the insured because this provision is a policy exclusion rather
than an affirmative term of the policy. 152
Because of the degree of deference the courts show toward
insureds in interpreting insurance policies, it can be difficult for
insurance companies to fit the facts of a suit within the "intended
or expected" exclusion.' 5" For example, as in Irene S., even the
unintended results of intentionally tortious acts may be covered.' 54
Further, even injury resulting from the commission of a crime will
not necessarily be excluded; conviction of a crime may be admitted
as rebuttable prima facie evidence of intent.'" Conviction of a
crime, however, may not constitute per se proof of intended or
expected injury if intent to injure is not an essential element of that
particular crime.'" For example, in the 1965 Texas Court of Civil
Appeals case of Orkin Exterminating v. Mass. Bonding and Insurance
Co., the insured exterminating company damaged rice in a ware-
' a9 E.g., Searle v. Allstate Life Ins, Co., 38 Gal. 3d 425, 438-39, 696 1'.2d 1308, 1316,
212 Cal. Rptr. 466, 474 (1985); Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life
Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 645, 652 (Minn. 1986); Facet Indus. v. Wright, 62 N.Y.2d 769, 772,
465 N.E.2d 1252, 1254, 477 N.Y,S.2d 316, 318 (1984).
The time and place an injury occurs is fixed at the time of the actual injury and not
at the time the negligent act that resulted in the injury was committed, E.g., Remitter v.
Glens Falls Indent. Co., 140 Cal. App. 26 84, 88, 295 P.26 19, 2i (1956); American Motorists
Ins. Co. v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 95 Misc. 2d 222, 223-25, 406 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659-60
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). See supra note 45 and accompanying text. for policy language.
151 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text for typical policy language.
152 E.g., Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 3d 425, 438-39, 696 I'.2d 1308, 1316,
212 Cal. Rptr. 466, 474 (1985); Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Am. Life
Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 645, 652 (Minn. 1986); Facet Indus, v. Wright, 62 N.Y.2d 769, 772,
465 N.E.2d 1252, 1254, 477 N.Y.S.2d 316, 318 (1984).
15$ E.g., Thorton v. Paul, 74 III. 26 132, 151, 384 N.E.2d 335, 343 (1978); State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Irene S. (Anonymous), 138 A.l).2d 589, 590, 526 N.Y.S.2d 171, 173
(1988); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins, Co., 400 S.W.2d 20, 27
(Tex. Ct. App. 1965).
154 138 A.1).2d at 589-91, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 172-73 (herpes transmitted as unintended
result of intentional rape); .see also MeGroarty v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 36 N.Y,2d 358, 364,
329 N.E.2d 172, 175, 368 N.Y.S,2d 485, 490 (1975).
155 E.g., 'Morton v. Paul, 74 ill. 2d 132, 151, 384 N.E.2d 335, 343 (1978).
' 56 Orkin Exterminating, 400 S.W.2d at 27.
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house when it negligently blew poison dust into the warehouse. 157
The court held that because there was no intent to inflict injury,
even if the act was a criminal violation of health laws, the act could
still be considered negligent and, therefore, covered by the insur-
ance policy.'" Similarly, transmission of STDs is a criminal violation
of health laws in many states, but it is not a crime that requires
intent to injure; therefore, it cannot be automatically considered
"intended" under the terms of a typical policy.' 59
If the insurance company decides to defend its insured rather
than disclaim responsibility and risk eventual liability, the insurance
company can assert, on the insurea's behalf, a variety of defenses
to the underlying tort.'" The insurance company may try to dem-
onstrate that an essential element of the negligence cause of action
is missing.'" Beyond this, the insurance company may attempt to
assert an affirmative defense for its insured based on theories such
as illegality, privacy or interspousal immunity.'" 2 These defenses
have not, however, proved to be successful in recent STD cases.'"
The defendant in the 1985 case of Long v. Adams unsuccessfully
raised the illegality defense.'" In Long v. Adams, the Georgia Court
of Appeals held that violation of a criminal statute by the plaintiff
does not void the plaintiff's right to recover in tort for injury
resulting from this violation.'" The trial court had dismissed the
plaintiff's suit against his girlfriend for negligent transmission of
herpes on the theory that in Georgia, consensual sex between un-
married adults is a violation of the state criminal fornication stat-
ute."'" The trial court held that a person could not maintain a
157 Id. at 23.
'5,
 Id. at 27.
1" E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3353 (West 1990) (misdemeanor); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTIf LAW § 2307 (McKinney 1990) (misdemeanor).
' 66 See infra notes 227-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of these defenses.
'"'	 v. R.L., 438 N.W2(1 441. 443 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (no duty to warn).
162 E.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert II., 105 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984)
(privacy); Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 333 S.E.2d 852 (1985) (illegality); S.A.V. v.
K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986) (interspousal immunity); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C.
516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920) (interspousal immunity).
' 63 E.g., Kathleen K., 105 Cal. App. 3d at 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276 (privacy); Long. 175
Ga. App. at 538, 933 S.E.2d at 853 (illegality); S.A.V., 708 S.W.2d at 652 (interspousal
immunity).
164 Long, 175 Ga. App. at 541, 333 S.E.2d at 855. See Casenote, Long v. Adams, The
Dirt on the Clean Hands Doctrine, 56 1_ .M.K.C. L. REv. 791, 796-800 (1988) for a more detailed
discussion of this case.
165 Long, 175 Ga, App. at 541, 333 S.E.2d at 855.
166 Id.
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private cause of action for an injury that arose while that person
was committing a crime.'"7 At one time this doctrine was recognized
with respect to STD transmission."' The Georgia Court of Appeals,
however, rejected the illegality argument in this case.'" 9 The court
held that this defense ignored the realities of present day morals
and would logically prevent unmarried women from recovering for
pregnancy and childbirth expenses from unwed fathers if the preg-
nancy was the result of illegal consensual intercourse)" In dicta,
however, the court did indicate that violation of a criminal forni-
cation statute could possibly lead to a successful defense based on
contributory negligence.m
Another possible defense available to the insurance company,
defending its insured in a negligent transmission of STD case, is
privacy: 72 The illegality defense is based on the state's interference
in sexual relations by criminalizing certain acts. The privacy de-
fense, however, contends that because the state had no right, to
interfere with consensual sex at all, it may not oversee such behavior
by allowing tort recovery for injury resulting from that behavior)"
In the 1984 case of Kathleen K. v. Robert B., heard in the California
Court < Appeal, the defendant raised the defense of privacy, as
guaranteed by the United States Constitution, in a suit against him
for negligent transmission of an STD. 17 ' 1 The court held that the
state's interest in legitimate tort recovery for serious bodily injury
outweighed any constitutional privacy interest that the defendant
had in protecting his sexual acts from state scrutiny: 75 The defen-
dant cited an earlier California case that had held that the state has
no legitimate interest in interfering with the intimate nature of a
sexual relationship by defining standards of conduct in such rela-
tionships or attaching liability to their results. 116 In the cited case,
in7 Id.
r"" See, e.g., Deeds v. Strode, 6 Idaho 317, 323, 55 1'. 656, 658 (1898) (a wife could not
site her second "husband" fir transmission of an STD because her first marriage was not
legally terminated and so the second "marriage" and all sexual acts in it were illegal).
''" Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 541, 333 S.E.2d 852, 855 (1985).
170 Id.
'I Id. (quoting Allen v. Gorton, 100 Ga. App. 744, 751, 112 S.E.2d 368, 372-73 (1959)).
172 E.g., Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 995-96, 198 Cal. Rpm 273,
275-76 (1984). For a more detailed discussion of this case see Note, A Cause of Action for
Genital Herpes Transmission, 34 CASE W. Rm. L. REV, 498, 509-14 (1984).
175 Kathleen K., 150 Cal, App. 3d at 995-96, 198 Cal. Rim'. at 275-76.
174 Id. at 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
175 id .
' 76 Id. at 994-95, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 275 (citing Stephen K. v. Rind L., 105 Cal. App. 3d
640, 644-45, 164 Cal, Rptr. 618, 620-21 (1980)).
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the plaintiff sought damages for "wrongful birth" of a child, alleging
that the child's mother had negligently represented that she was
using birth control pills.' 77 The Kathleen K. court distinguished the
instant case from the earlier case on the grounds that more serious
tortious conduct and injury was involved in Kathleen K. and that
different policy considerations came into play.' 78 The court, there-
fore, concluded that the right of privacy is not absolute and, in
some cases, is subordinate to the state's fundamental right to enact
laws that promote public health, welfare and safety, even though
such laws may infringe upon the offender's right of privacy.' 79
Another defense available in the underlying tort action is in-
terspousal immunity.'" At common law, husband and wife were
considered to be a single legal entity and, therefore, a suit between
them was illogical and forbidden. 18 ' Today most states have aban-
doned this doctrine.' 82 Interspousal immunity once had a definite
application as a defense in cases of transmission of STDs between
husband and wife,' 83 but by the 1920s courts were already rejecting
this doctrine as outmoded in STD cases.' 84 The 1986 Missouri Su-
preme Court decision in S.A.V. v. K.G.V. has continued this trend
by allowing a negligent herpes transmission suit between a husband
and a wife.'" The Missouri court rejected arguments that allowing
such suits would produce a flood of trivial cases or that it would
promote marital disharmony.'" The court reasoned that such ar-
guments, based on archaic notions of marriage, had proved un-
founded in states that had already abrogated the interspousal im-
munity doctrine.' 87
In sum, insurance companies may try to evade their duty to
defend suits alleging negligent transmission on the basis that the
insured's actions are not covered by the policy. Such an evasion is
'" Stephen K., 105 Cal. App. 3d at 641-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
17" Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d at 996-97, 198 Cal, Rim.. at 276.
179 Id. at 996, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
t" E.g., S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Mo. 1980); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C.
516, 522-24, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920).
" 1 RESTATF.MEN •  (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895F comment b (1977).
'"a See Price v. Price, 732 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1987) for a list of states that have
abrogated the doctrine.
1 " E.g., Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 81-83, 75 N.W. 287, 287-88 (1898);
Shultz v. Christopher, 05 Wash. 496, 497-501, 118 P. 629, 629-31 (1911).
1 " Crowell, 180 N.C. at 522-24, 105 S.E. at 210.
S.A.V., 708 S.W.2d al 652.
' 86 Id. at 652.
187 Id. at 652-53.
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difficult to successfully achieve, however, because of the liberality
with which courts usually interpret policies to protect insureds. If
insurance companies do take on the defense of their insured, they
may attempt to use the affirmative defenses of illegality, privacy or
interspousal immunity. None of these has met with much success
in the recent past however. This leads to the question of what
additional measures insurance companies can and should take to
protect themselves if the holdings in R.W. and Irene S. are widely
followed, and whether other courts will, in fact, follow these hold-
ings.
V. SHOULD OTHER JURISDICTIONS FOLLOW IRENE S. AND R.W. AND
How CouLD INSURANCE COMPANIES REACT IF THEY Do?
From a purely legal standpoint, Irene S. and R.W. should meet
with acceptance in all American jurisdictions. These holdings are
in complete accord with previous case law concerning both tort
liability and insurance coverage.'" Although policy arguments fa-
voring rejection of these holdings can be made, such arguments are
not compelling. Policy considerations for refusing to follow these
holdings, such as expense to insurance companies and dangers of
fraud, are outweighed by the general policy of seeking compensa-
tion for deserving victims.' 8 •
Because widespread acceptance of these holdings seems likely,
insurance companies must prepare to be involved in more suits for
negligent transmission of STDs. Insurance companies may continue
• to attempt to avoid any involvement under current policies,'" or
they may accept their. responsibility to defend these suits and use
the various defenses against the underlying tort action to protect
their insured.'`'' Alternatively, insurance companies may try to de-
crease the number of suits by specifically excluding coverage from
future policies or by reducing incidents of disease transmission
through educational programs encouraging "safe sex."' 92
1 " Sec supra notes 31-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of preceding case
law.
"0
 Sec infra notes 206-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy issues.
' 9" E.g.. North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. R.W., 431 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988);
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Irene S. (Anonymous), 138 A.D.2c1 589, 590, 526 N.Y.S.2d
171, 173 (1988).
Sec supra notes 227-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the defenses to
the underlying tort action.
,92
 The exclusion approach was explicitly suggested by the R.W. court. North Star Mut.
Ins. Co. v. R.W., 431 N.W.2d 138, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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Irene S. and R.W. should be followed nationally from a legal
point of view. It is well established that recovery in negligence for
transmission of STDs is legally no different from any other action
in negligence.'" Attempts to distinguish negligent transmission of
STDs from other negligent acts on grounds of illegality, privacy or
spousal immunity have been notably unsuccessful in cases such as
Long, Kathleen K. and S.A.V.' 94 Moreover, it is similarly well estab-
lished that insurance companies may, and in fact do, legally cover
the ordinarily negligent actions of their insureds.'`'' Because insur-
ers will probably continue to offer liability insurance along with
homeowner's insurance, courts will continue to face these issues.
Fortunately, other courts have the example of . the New York
appellate court to follow. In Irene S., the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division took the underlying tort and insurance law doc-
trines to their correct, maximum extensions. The Irene S. court was
correct in basing its decision on the doctrine that even intentional
torts may occur simultaneously with actions that are merely negli-
gent.'• On the basis of this reasoning, intentional torts may result
in damage that is actionable either in ordinary negligence or in
intentional tort.
A plaintiff may reasonably prefer to bring an action in negli-
gence, rather than in intentional tort, because to win on intentional
tort grounds the plaintiff must prove the defendant's state of
mind.'''? In a negligence action, the plaintiff need only prove the
"easier" issue of whether the defendant behaved reasonably.'" In
our adversarial system, plaintiffs should have the choice of the
correct theory under which to pursue their claims. As long as there
are reasonable grounds for a finding of ordinary negligence, an
insurance company should not be able to evade its duties simply
because the plaintiff has exercised his or her legal right to compose
a trial strategy and chooses to press a claim in negligence, rather
than intentional tort.
' 91 See supra notes 31-73 and accompanying text For a discussion of STD negligence
cases.
191 See supra notes 137-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
95 See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of insurance coverage
of negligence.
State Farm Fire Sc Casualty Co. v. Irene S. (Anonymous), 138 A.D.2d 589,591,526
N.Y.S.2d 171,173 (1988). See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of
cases establishing this principle.
'" 7 See PuossER & KEF.TON, .supra note 31, at 485.
Id.
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On this point, the Minnesota court in R.W. took an overly
cautious approach. By considering the issue of whether the trans-
mission of herpes was "accidental" and, therefore, covered under
the terms of the defendant's policy, the court, citing Minnesota
precedent, defined accidental as "unexpected, unforeseen or unde-
signed." 1 " This definition must have the same functional meaning
as "unexpected and unintended" in typical policies. If unforeseen
were taken to mean "unforeseeable," the policy would not cover
any liability because the injury would have to be foreseeable by a
reasonable person to create liability in the first place. 26°
Nevertheless, the court appeared to resolve the issue of whether
this occurrence was an accident by resort to the defendant's answer
to the plaintiff's allegation that he knew that he had herpes.20i In
his answer, the defendant stated that he did not know that he had
herpes and that the transmission was purely an accident. 202 Even if
the court were correct in considering whether the transmission
could be found to be a pure accident in the lay sense of the word,
it was entirely wrong in allowing the defendant's pleadings to raise
the issue. If courts were to use the defendant's defenses to establish
the insurance company's obligations, insurance companies would be
placed in an intolerable situation. Any insured could force his in-
surance company to defend an action against him simply by raising
the defense of accident or mistake, even if the plaintiff alleges only
intentionally tortious behavior. Allowing the defendant's pleading
to establish the duties of the insurance company is illogical because
the insurance company's duty to defend is supposed to be based on
whether a judgment could result that would require indemnifica-
tion.203 If the plaintiff's complaint alleges only intentionally tortious
behavior, the insured defendant cannot be found liable for ordinary
negligence, regardless of the defense raised.
Minnesota and other states will do much better to follow New
York's lead and rest such judgments solely on the allegations, or
lack thereof, of ordinary negligence in the plaintiff's complaint.
New York's Irene S. decision is in accord with existing insurance
case law in relying solely on the plaintiff's allegations to determine
1 " North Star Mut. ins. Co. v. R.W., 431 N.W.2d 138,140 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
2D° PROSSER & KEETON, supra nute 31, at 485.
2°1
 R. W., 431 N.W.2d at 141.
2"2 Id. at 139.
s°' See supra notes 97-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of the basis fir
duty to defend.
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duty to defend. 2" In addition, it correctly recognized that the plain-
tiff rather than the defendant has control over the type of allega-
tions brought. 2°5
Even though other jurisdictions have good legal reasons to
follow New York and Minnesota in allowing homeowner's insurance
coverage of negligent transmission of STDs, there are policy argu-
ments both for and against such holdings. Allowing such recoveries
may have a substantial and unexpected impact on the profitability
of insurance companies. This would be especially unacceptable if
many such insurance recoveries resulted from fraud or collusion,
rather than because a victim actually deserved recovery. On the
other hand, insurance coverage of negligent transmission of STDs
increases the chances that deserving victims will actually be com-
pensated because insolvency of the defendant will no longer prevent
such victims from recovering judgments. Moreover, defendants will
have less economic incentive to conceal fraudulently their negli-
gence because their insurance company will more likely cover a
judgment against them.
The potential for litigation and substantial judgments in STD
transmission cases is tremendous. In the case of herpes, for exam-
ple, there are an estimated 300,000 new sufferers each year. 208
Because the only common form of herpes transmission is through
sexual contact with an infected person, 207 and few people would
willingly consent to the risk of infection, it seems likely that most of
these new cases of herpes involve actionable negligence. The precise
magnitude of STD cases is a matter of dispute even among ex-
perts. 208 Suits for negligent transmission of STDs, however, raise
various practical problems of proof as well as the more subjective
issue of embarrassment of plaintiffs. These issues may dramatically
204 E.g., American Home Assurance Co. v. Port Auth., 66 A.D.2d 269, 277-78, 412
N.Y.S.2d 605, 609-10 (1979); see, e.g., Hogan v. Midland Nat. Ins. Co., 3 Cal. 3d 553, 563-
64, 476 P.2d 825, 831, 91 Cal. Rpt.r. 153, 159 (1970); Barnstable County Mut. Fire Ins. Co.
v. Lally, 374 Mass. 602, 604, 373 N.E.2d 966, 968 (1978); Jostens, Inc, v. Mission Ins. Co.,
387 N.W.2d 161, 165 (Minn. 1986); Colon v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 66 N.Y.2d 6,
9-10, 484 N.E.2d 1040, 1041, 494 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (1985).
205 State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Irene S. (Anonymous), 138 A.D.2d 589, 591, 526
N.Y.S.2d 171, 173 (1988).
206 D, LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note I, at 78.
207 LAWYERS MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA § 36.18(A) (1986).
208 For instance, CDC data lists less than 700,000 cases of gonorrhea annually, 38
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 886 (Jan. 5,
1990), while another source puts the figure at 2.5 million. Grossman & Jawetz, supra note
30, at 920.
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reduce the likelihood that potential plaintiffs will actually bring such
actions or, if brought, reduce the likelihood of success. 209 Neverthe-
less, if even a small fraction of the potential cases resulted in settle-
ments or judgments, the effects would be considerable:21 "
Another policy argument against allowing insurance coverage
of damages in STD cases is the danger of collusion or fraud between
the plaintiff and the defendant. Given the private nature of sexual
relations, it is likely that only the plaintiff' and the defendant are
aware of the true circumstances surrounding the STD transmission.
Even if the plaintiff and the defendant know that the transmission
was truly intentional, not negligent, it will be in the plaintiff's best
interest to "plead into coverage" and allege negligence. 2 " It would
then be in the defendant's best interest to admit such negligence so
that the insurance company, rather than the defendant, will pay the
judgment. 212 Despite this incentive to commit fraud, courts should
not simply dismiss all cases of negligent STD transmission, including
the meritorious ones, in order to eliminate the few fraudulent ones.
Moreover, insurance coverage for negligent transmission of STDs
may actually decrease one type of fraud that undoUbtedly occurs
under the present conditions. When defendants know that they will
209 See infra notes 229-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the practical
evidentiary limitations on plaintiffs.
21 q For instance, in a case of negligent transmission of gonorrhea a jury awarded the
plaintiff $1.3 million ($300,000 compensatory, $1,000,000 punitive). Duke v. House'', 589
P.2d 334, 339-40 (Wyo. 1979). in Duke the appellate court vacated the jury verdict on statute
of limitations grounds. As long ago as 1920 a jury in Crowell v. Crowell awarded $10,000 to
a plaintiff in an STD case, 180 N.C. 516, 517, 105 S,E. 2061, 207 (1920). Because AIDS cases
involve slow but inevitable death, awards in such cases could be much higher. This is especially
true because of CDC data showing that more than 80% of AIDS deaths are of persons
between the ages of twenty and forty-nine when earning potential and life expectancy are
very high. Summary of Notifiable Diseases, United States, 1988, 37 CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 10 (Oct. 6, 1989). Medical costs alone
for AIDS patients average about $18,000 annually. Now that AIDS is Treatable, supra note 2,
at 118.
211
	 Delienedictis, The Alliance, 75 A.B.A. J. 59, 63 for a discussion of this practice
atnong personal injury lawyers.
217 In the past., many suits have alleged willful and wanton negligence or intentional tort
in addition to ordinary negligence, which has the advantage of allowing recovery for nominal
and punitive damages as well as compensatory damages. E.g., Long v. Adams, 175 Ga, App.
538, 538, 333 S.E.2d 852, 853 (1985); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651, 652 (Mo. 1986). If
insurance will not cover any recovery, it does not matter what the basis is for the judgment.
Now that insurance will apparently cover ordinary negligence, many future plaintiffs would
be wise to follow the example of the plaintiff in R. W. and specifically indicate that the suit is
in negligence, and not intentional tort, to avoid the possibility of winning in intentional tort,
but then being unable to collect the judgment. See North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. R.W., 431
N.W.2d 138, 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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have to pay any judgment against them out of their own pockets,
they have a much greater incentive to lie concerning the true cir-
cumstances of the transmission than if insurance will cover them.
If defendants are more inclined to tell the truth, plaintiffs with
meritorious cases are more likely to be awarded the compensation
they deserve.
Overall, allowing homeowner's insurance coverage of negligent
transmission of STlls may significantly increase the likelihood that
legitimate victims will be compensated. Plaintiffs currently bring
suits for negligent transmission even where no insurance coverage
exists:213 The widespread adoption of Irene S. and R.W., however,
would probably increase the number of such suits. By making in-
surance money available to cover judgments for negligent trans-
mission of'STDs, New York and Minnesota have removed one major
practical disincentive to bringing such a suit. Plaintiffs no longer
need fear that they will be unable to collect a judgment if their
successful suit forces the defendant into bankruptcy. 2 " Moreover,
the personal injury bar can represent such clients on a contingency
fee basis with some reasonable expectation of compensation if they
are successful.
Moreover, an argument exists that, as a matter of public policy,
insurance should not be available to cover negligent acts because if'
people know that they will have to pay judgments out of their own
pockets, they will be more careful and will commit fewer negligent.
acts.215 Courts have reacted to this argument by judging that the
benefit of' having all victims compensated is greater than any benefit
from reduction in negligent acts that might occur if insurance were
not available to cover negligence. 21 " A society that requires auto-
mobile owners to carry liability insurance for negligent acts involv-
ing their automobiles can hardly condemn voluntary personal lia-
bility coverage. 217
 The general policy underlying the right of private
actions in tort is that victims should be restored to the condition
they were in prior to the defendant's negligence. 218 This goal of'
compensation is best served if liability insurance is available to com-
2 " E.g., Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 339-40 (Wyo. 1979).
2" Of course some plaintiff's seeking revenge rather than compensation might prefer
to send the defendant into bankruptcy.
215 PROSSER & KErrorc, supra note 31, at 585.
216 R. KEETON & A. WIDDIS, supra note 11, at 376.
2" See id. at 377.
2I  PROSSER & KEnON, supra note 31, at 6.
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pensate plaintiffs for large judgments that are beyond the defen-
danes personal economic resources.
Public policy reasons to disallow recovery under homeowner's
insurance for negligent transmission of STDs do not outweigh the
benefits of allowing such recoveries. Concern about unexpected
insurance company costs and potentially fraudulent suits are legit-
imate. These considerations, however, arc outweighed by the need
to ensure that real victims of negligent transmission of STDs are
fully compensated for their injuries. Allowing homeowner's insur-
ance to cover such claims increases the chances that victims will be
compensated, both by creating a source of compensation from oth-
erwise judgment proof defendants and by eliminating defendant
incentives to lie about the factual circumstances of the transmission.
There appear to be no satisfactory reasons why . most American
jurisdictions should not follow the New York and Minnesota rulings
allowing homeowner's insurance coverage of negligent transmission
of STDs. Insurance companies, therefore, must be prepared to face
more suits of this type in the future. flow insurance companies deal
with these suits will have an impact on their future profits.
Several options are available to insurance companies with re-
gard to such suits. First, they may continue to try to avoid any
obligation toward their insureds in such cases by arguing that even
if insurance generally covers STD transmission cases, it does not
cover the particular suit against. their insured. 2 9 Second, insurance
companies may simply defend such suits and rely on the evidentiary
difficulties of plaintiffs in such suits to protect them against ultimate
liability and the cost of defense. 22" Third, if the plaintiff is able to
carry the burden of proving the basic cause of' action, the insurance
company still retains the option of asserting any of the affirmative
defenses available to the insured in the underlying tort actionf22 '
Fourth, if insurance companies want to avoid such suits entirely,
they may specifically exclude coverage for negligent transmission
of STDs in future policies. Finally, insurance companies could try
to reduce the source of STD transmission suits by launching an
educational campaign to promote "safe sex."
2 '" E.g., North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. R.W., 431 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988);
State Faint Fire & Casually Co. v. Irene S. (Anonymous), 138 A.D.2d 589, 590, 526 N.Y.S.2d
171, 173 (1988).
22"
 See infra notes 229-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the practical
evidentiary litnitaticms on plaintiffs.
22 ' Sec supra notes 227-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the defenses to
the underlying tort action.
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An insurance company will generally find it difficult to argue
successfully that its policy does not cover a particular incident of
transmission of an STD. First, because the typical policy covers all
actions of the insured leading to liability and then specifically ex-
cludes only "expected and intended" injuries, the insured carries
an easier burden of proof:222 Second, if the insurance company
seeks to avoid its duty to defend, the insured, again because of
evidentiary burdens, will have a good chance of compelling a de-
fense. This is because in a suit against the insurance company for
not defending the insured, the insured is the plaintiff, and must
only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury
complained of is alleged to have resulted from the defendant's
actions. 223 Because the cause of action for the underlying suit in
negligence requires such an allegation, the insured should never
have difficulty meeting this burden. 224 The insurance company,
however, in raising the affirmative defense of the "intent exclusion"
to its duty to defend or indemnify, has the much more difficult
burden of showing that the injury complained of was intended or
expected by the insured. 225 Unless the insurance company can show
that the injury alleged was outside the scope of its coverage, it will
have to defend the insured against the underlying tort action. 226
Although the typical defendant in a negligent transmission of
an STD suit will be able to compel his insurance company to defend
him, that insurance company will probably find that it is unlikely to
lose the case and, therefore, have to pay a judgment. The greatest
strengths of the typical defendant's case in a negligent transmission
of STD suit are the practical difficulties that the plaintiff will have
in proving that the essential elements of negligence exist. 227 Al-
222 See supra notes 148-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of burdens of proof
in snrn insurance cases.
225 E.g., Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Whitaker, 181 Cal. App. 3d 532, 538, 226 Cal. Rptr.
435, 437 (1986); Markline Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 139. 140, 424 N.E.2d 464,
465 (1981); Lapierre, Litchfield & Partners v. Continental Casualty Co., 59 Misc. 2d '20, 23,
297 N.Y,S.2d 976, 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
224 E.g., Royal Globe Ins., 181 Cal. App. 3d at 538, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 437; Markline, 384
Mass. at 140, 424 N.E.2d at 465; Lapierre, 59 Misc. 2d at 23, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
225 E.g., Searle v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 3d 425, 438-39, 696 P.2d 1308, 1316,
212 Cal. Rptr. 466, 474 (1985); Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v, Fireman's Fund Am. Life
Ins. Co., 383 N.W.2d 645, 652 (Minn. 1986); Facet Indus. v. Wright, 62 N.Y.2d 769, 772,
465 N.E.2d 1252, 1254, 477 N,Y,S.2d 316, 318 (1984).
22" E.g., Searle, 38 Cal. 3d at 438-39, 696 P.2(1 at 1316, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 474; Henning
Nelson, 383 N.W.2d at 652; Facet Indus., 62 N.Y.2d at 772, 465 N.E.2d at 1254, 477 N.Y.S.2d
at 318.
227 See supra notes 31-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements of the
underlying tort action.
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though, the legal element of duty is well established 228 and injury
is readily determinable medically, plaintiffs will have tremendous
difficulty proving causation, that the defendant was the source of
the injury, and breach, that the defendant did, in fact, fail to warn
them and that they did not waive this warning through assumption
of the risk or contributory negligence. 22 °
The plaintiff's first evidentiary problem is proving that the
defendant was the source of injury. The plaintiff must prove that
the defendant could have and did cause the injury. As a threshold
issue, the plaintiff will have to show that the plaintiff and defendant
engaged in sexual intercourse, that the defendant had the STD at
the time of that sexual intercourse, and that the plaintiff did riot.
Medical examinations of both parties, fortuitously close to, but prior
to, the time of transmission would provide good evidence of this,
but, in most cases, only the testimony of the parties will provide this
evidence. In the likely event of diametrically opposed testimony,
outcome of the case may hinge entirely on the subjective judgment
of the jury regarding the credibility of the parties."° Because the
plaintiff carries the burden of proof on this issue, the jury should
find for the defendant if it cannot decide that one party is more
credible than the other, a not unlikely possibility.
Beyond simply showing what could have happened, the plaintiff
also has the task of proving that the defendant did cause the in-
jury."' The symptoms of the major STDs other than AIDS appear
soon after the victim has contracted the disease. 232 Most plaintiffs,
therefore, should have little difficulty determining who gave them
the disease. Plaintiffs who have had multiple sexual partners during
the period when the infection must have occurred, however, may
228 See supra notes 33-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duly element.
229 See infra notes 230-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the practical
problems of proof for plaintiffs in these areas.
230 This type of testimony also raises the issue of embarrassment as a potential bar to
bringing suit for many plaintiffs. Many plaintiffs may be hesitant to discuss their sex lives in
public or to have their lifestyles attacked oil the stand. Many of the same issues that prompted
passage of rape shield laws apply in these cases, but without the public necessity of encour-
aging victims to bring charges.
23 ' See supra note 31 and accompanying text for the elements of negligence.
442 For instance herpes initially manifests itself in painful sores and blisters on the
genitals often accompanied by painful urination, fever and malaise. Corey & Spear (pt. 2),
supra note 30, at 750. These symptoms begin to appear within 5 to 10 days of infection. D.
LLEWEL.LYN-JONES, supra note 1, at 23. Initial gonorrhea symptoms appear within 3-5 days,
but 60% of women and 20% of men develop no immediate symptoms, which may cause
difficulties of proof' in some cases. Id. at 19. Syphilis symptoms may take as long as 90 days
to develop. Grossman, Jawetz & Jacobs, supra note 30, at 928.
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have a more difficult time proving this element, especially if more
than one of those sexual partners is shown to have had the STD
prior to intercourse with the plaintiff. 233
 If the plaintiff in such a
case can offer no specific evidence that the defendant was the source
of disease, the defendant will probably be able to obtain a summary
judgment.
If the case is an AIDS transmission case, the plaintiff may have
a difficult time proving when the transmission occurred. Because
AIDS symptoms may not appear for as long as five years after
exposure to the disease, 23.1
 it. will be much harder for plaintiffs in
AIDS transmission cases to pinpoint the precise occurrence during
which the transmission took place. Although, the problem of proof
for the AIDS plaintiff with multiple sexual partners may not be any
different from that of other STD plaintiffs, the statistics do not
favor the AIDS plaintiff. The fact that AIDS may go undetected
for a long and indeterminate period of time increases the chances
that a person who has contracted it will. not be able to identify the
person from whom he or she contracted the disease. The fact that
AIDS may go undetected for a long period of time increases the
chances of greater numbers of exposures to the disease. Although
the "multiple sexual partners" problem is not necessarily insur-
mountable for the plaintiff, the argument that the defendant was
not the source of injury in such cases is a powerful defense against
many plaintiffs. Plaintiffs who have had sexual relations exclusively
with the defendant for a time longer than the incubation period of
the STD will have the best chance of avoiding this defense.
The plaintiff must also prove that the defendant knew or
should have known the risk that he or she posed to the plaintiff. 235
Showing that a defendant knew or should have known that the
defendant had syphilis, gonorrhea or herpes should be relatively
simple. All manifest themselves with painful symptoms within a few
days of contracting the clisease. 25" Although these diseases may
become asymptomatic while remaining communicable, 2" 7 the fact
that the defendant was on notice at the time that he or she originally
254
	 commentator has made ihe rather bizarre suggestion that such plaintiffs could
sue a number of persons from Whom they could have gotten the STD on a Sindell market
share theory. Kohn, Conflicting Rights of Privacy and the Duly of Disclosure Between Sexual Partners,
11 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 264,268-69 (1983),
294 J. LANGONE, supra note 30, it 11.
2" See supra notes 52-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the duty element.
236 See supra nmes 30 & 232 and accompanying text for a discussion of the symptoms.
2"
 Corey & Spear (pt. 1), .supra note 30, at 690.
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contracted the disease will probably satisfy the "should have known"
requirement, even if the defendant. had no symptoms at the actual
time of transmission.
AIDS presents a more difficult situation. Most persons who
contract AIDS experience no immediate symptoms of the disease. 238
It may be as long as five years alter contracting the disease before
noticeable symptoms appear. 2"" During this time, the person who
has contracted AIDS is an "asymptomatic carrier" capable of spread-
ing the disease to others. 2"° During this period laboratory tests can
indicate that the carrier probably has the AIDS virus, but these tests
are unable to detect AIDS during the first two weeks to six months
after exposure." Because of this uncertainty, it would be reason-
able for courts to hold that members of "high risk" groups have an
obligation to warn the sexual partners of this status if they do not
know whether they are, in fact, AIDS carriers.
Finally, a defendant may argue that he or she, in fact, fulfilled
the duty to warn, thus destroying a vital element of the cause of
action.242 An explicit. assumption of risk by the plaintiff should
certainly provide an absolute defense for the defendant. If' the
defendant can show that the plaintiff was aware of and understood
the risk and .nevertheless voluntarily undertook it, the plaintiff will
be completely barred from recovery in negligence. 249 This will be
true even if the defendant breached his duty to inform the plaintiff
of' the risk, as long as the plaintiff does learn of the risk. 244 For
example, the plaintiff may recognize that the defendant has the
symptoms of an STD. As with other issues of proof, the extent of
the plaintiff's consent will be largely an issue of the credibility of
the parties, thereby putting the plaintiff at a disadvantage due to
the burden of proof' placed on the plaintiff.""•
It may even be possible to argue that plaintiffs who engage in
sufficiently high risk behavior have by implication assumed the risk
2" J. LANcioNE, AIDS: TicE FAcrrs 10 (1988).
299 Id. at 48.
24" Id. at 10-11.
241 Id.
242 See supra note 31 and accionpanying lex( for the elements of negligence.
215 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 31, at 480-84.
2 '14
 The plaintiff might learn of the risk horn some source other than the defendant.
For example, the plaintiff in B.N. v. K.K. was a nurse who might have, but apparently did
not, notice that the defendant had symptoms of herpes. See 312 Md. 135, 138, 530 A.2d
1175, 1177 (1988). 1f such a plaintiff were to proceed to have sex after acquiring knowledge
of the defendants infection, she would assume the risk.
2" See supra. notes 148-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of burdens of proof
in STD insurance cases.
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of the known probable consequences of such behavior. 2at' This might
be the case, for example, with plaintiffs who have had multiple
homosexual sex partners, never using "safe-sex" techniques."' Al-
ternatively, high risk behavior might. be shown to be a form of
contributory or comparative negligence that might reduce, if not
eliminate, the judgment for the plaintiff. 2 't 8 Thus far, however,
courts have placed the burden of disclosure of the risk of STD
transmission squarely on the defendant and have not imposed any
duty to discover on the plaintiff. 249
The Georgia Court of Appeals has suggested that violation of
statute might be used to prove contributory negligence per se on the
part of the plaintiff. 280 Although actually an affirmative defense,
contributory negligence is closely allied to assumption of the risk. 25 '
In the per se situation, the violation of statute is relevant only if the
.defendant can show that the statute was enacted to prevent the type
of injury that occurred. 252 Anti-fornication statutes exist in only a
few states and seem to be morals statutes rather than public health
statutes. 253 The more numerous anti-sodomy statutes 254 have similar
morality origins, but in light of the health risks of sodomy a better
case might be made that these statutes are also intended to prevent
the spread of disease. Therefore, a contributory negligence per se
argument is more likely to succeed in cases involving negligent
transmission of AIDS.
If the plaintiff establishes all of the elements of the underlying
cause of action successfully, defendants will have to rely on affir-
mative defenses. Beyond assumption of the risk, other affirmative
defenses are much less promising. Most states no longer accept the
illegality defense for any type of tort. 255 Courts are unlikely to apply
245 This might be analogous to the implied assumption of risk taken by engaging in
other unreasonably dangerous activities. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 31, at 481.
2" J. LANGONE, .supra note 30, at 11.
248 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 31, at 232.
249 E.g., B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 142, 538 A.2d 1175, 1179 (1988).
2" Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 541, 333 S.E.2d 852, 855 (1985) (quoting Allen
v. Gornto, 100 Ga. App. 2d 744, 751, 112 S.E.2d 368, 372-73 (1959)); see also PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 31, at 220-34; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 469 (1977).
251 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 31, at 485.
252 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 286; PROSSER 8c KEETON, supra note
31, at 224-30 (1984).
25' E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (1988).
254 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16.6-2(a) (1988); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 34 (Law. Co-op
1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293 (West 1987).
255 PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 31, at 232.
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the illegality defense in STD cases; as illustrated by the Georgia
court in Long v. Adams. 25" The privacy defense is no more likely to
succeed. The Kathleen K. decision in California effectively argues
against any constitutional privacy defense to STD transmission
suits. 257 The court's rationale was that states have a legitimate inter-
est in interfering with intimate sexual relationships to prevent injury
to their citizens, or in this case, to allow recovery for injury, 258
Because most states do, in fact, interfere with various aspects of
intimate sexual relationships by statute 259 without running afoul of
the Constitution, 21i" this decision would seem to be correct for other
jurisdictions as well as for California.
As a defense to tort actions, most states have rejected inter-
spousal immunity. 261 Even where it remains in effect, it is unlikely
to be a factor in homeowner's insurance cases. The reason is that
the spouse of the policy holder is not normally considered as a
"person other than the insured" to whom liability payment must be
made by the insurance company. 262 Thus, although a spouse can
sue for negligent transmission of an STD, he or she cannot recover
under homeowner's insurance.
Even though insurance companies have little chance of avoid-
ing their duty to defend and indemnify insureds who are sued for
STD transmission under typical liability policies, the companies can
still keep their costs down. Insurance companies can avoid the
expense of future cases of negligent transmission of STDs by re-
writing their standard homeowner's policies.
If insurance companies do not want to provide coverage for
negligent transmission of STDs in their homeowner's policies, they
25" 175 Ga. App. 538, 541, 333 S.E.2d 852, 855 (1985).
25 ' See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984). See
supra notes 172-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the case. See Murray & Winslett,
The Constitutional Right to Privacy and Emerging Tort Liability for Deceit in Interpersonal Relation-
ships, 1986 U. ILL L. REV. 779, 789-97 (1986) for a further discussion of privacy issues in
s-1'I] cases.
258 Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App, 3d at 996-97, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
25s
	 supra notes 159, 253-54 and accompanying text for examples of sodomy and
fornication statutes.
265 The Supreme Court has explicitly allowed state interference with private consensual
homosexual relations. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
26 See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of interspousal
immunity.
262 E.g., COUCH, supra note 10, at § 1:61; R. KEETON! & A. Winn's, supra note 11, at 1133
(sample policies referring to insured as including members of policyholder's household who
are related).
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may simply follow the suggestion of the R.W. court and explicitly
exclude such coverage. 2" Insurance companies could accomplish
this end by a simple definition in the exclusions section such as:
"Bodily injury within the meaning of this policy does not include
sexually transmitted disease." Insurers with such exclusions might
even use the exclusion as a selling point by offering slightly lower
premiums for policies with these exclusions and calling these poli-
cies "safe sex" policies. This would take care of the problem sug-
gested by the insurance company's arguments in R.W. that insureds
should not have to pay, through their premiums, for the negligent
sexual behavior of other insureds.'" Offering such policies would
parallel the practice now used in other types of insurance. Insurers
that offer health insurance market lower priced policies to those
who exercise or those who do not smoke. 2"5
 Similarly, companies
that offer automobile insurance have offered less expensive policies
to those with safe driving records. 2""
Beyond accommodating those people who would like to be able
to purchase the less expensive "safe sex" policies, insurance com-
panies could also offer "high risk" policies. "High risk" policies
would specifically cover transmission of STDs. Although this cov-
erage would be expensive, people with fairly large personal assets
who had reason to fear liability for transmission of STDs might be
willing to pay the high premium for such coverage.
Rather than operating on the assumption that suits for trans-
mission of STDs must continue unabated, insurance companies
could also take steps to help reduce the number of these cases by
educating the public. Insurance companies have had success in the
past using their considerable marketing and lobbying power to
increase awareness of safe driving practices and to promote safer
practices in many industries. With an ever increasing economic
incentive to reduce the number of potential STD suits, insurance
companies have every reason to try to reduce the actual number of
incidents of negligent transmission by educating both their insureds
and the general public about the dangers of many sexual lifestyles
and practices.
263
 North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. R.W., 431 N.W.2d 138, 143 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
Id.
2"S COUCit, supra note 10, at § 37:71.
266
 M. WoontutooF- J. FONSECA, A. SQUILLANTE, AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT
LAW, 272 (1974).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The New York and Minnesota courts were correct in holding
that. coverage for negligent transmission of STDs exists under the
terms of the typical homeowner's insurance policy. Other jurisdic-
tions should follow these holdings because they are correct from
both a legal and a policy standpoint. Society will be best served if
such coverage is allowed because it will help to insure that. more
victims of negligent. STD transmission are fully compensated despite
the insolvency of defendants.
Because cases involving negligent transmission of STDs will
probably become more common if these holdings are generally
accepted, insurance companies should begin preparing to deal with
the defenses of insureds sued for negligent transmission of STDs.
In addition, insurance companies must consider steps to reduce
their exposure to such cases entirely, either through policy exclu-
sions, or more constructively, through educational efforts designed
to reduce the total number of incidents of negligent transmission
of sexually transmitted disease.
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